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'I'HE CI'l'Y OF l.JOS AN-
for Public Use.-Where 
is placed on in court, the lien 
bond attaches to the award and is 
from the condemned land. 
Domain-Persons Entitled to Compensation-Lien-
holders.-:B'ailure of to join a lienholder under a street 
bond in a condemnation instituted 
the land subject to the lien left the lien un-
the lienholder was not otherwise protected, 
e.g., by deposit in court. 
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Recovery of Possession. 
a condemnation proceeding by which a city ac-
quired an easement for street purposes across land on which 
a street improvement bond constituted a lien was not effec-
tive to perfect the title as against the lienholder, because 
of failure to him in the condemnation proceeding, the 
devotion of the condemned land to public 
the lienholder's successor in interest from gain-
and disrupting the public use. 
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse Condemnation. 
-\Vhere failure to a lienholder under a street improve-
ment bond in a condemnation proceeding instituted by the 
city for street purposes leaves his lien unimpaired by the 
judgment, the doctrine of inverse condemnation entitles him 
to compensation for the taking of a part of his interest in the 
property. 
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse Condemnation. 
-The claim filing requirements of a city charter cannot apply 
to a claim for compensation for a taking by the city by 
eminent domain because it is not a municipal affair; it is a 
See Ca1.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 385 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Eminent Domain, § 380 et seq. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain,§§ 7, 374 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Conversion,§ 4; [2] Eminent Domain, 
§58; [3] Eminent Domain, § 195; [4, 5, 13, 14] Eminent Domain, 
§ 194; [6, 9-11] Municipal Corporations, § 72; [7] Municipal Cor-
porations, § 86; [8] Eminent Domain, § 43(1); [12] Municipal 










A charter cannot 
this being a matter of 
cent Wharf & ·warehouse 
[278 P. 1028], and v. of V '.mt ura, 39 
732 [104 P.2d 102].) 
[11] Id.-Charters-Applicability.-City charter do not 
apply to a conYentional eminent domain 
[12] Id.-Claims-Presentment.-Filing a elaim a 
for damages resulting from condemnation of land is not a 
prerequisite to recovery of such 
[13] Eminent Domain-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse 
Condemnation.-In inverse condemnation the owner 
is forced to prosecute proceedings, for otherwise he is remedi-
less; his action may be to recover the and for pre-
ventiye relief in that connection, and rs not a demand for 
money within charter provisions claims 
against the city. 
(14] !d.-Remedies for Unlawful Condemnation. 
The right of a lienholder under a street improvement bond, 
who was not joined in a condemnation proceeding instituted 
by the city for street purposes, to comp(·nsation, under the doc-
trine of inverse condemnation for the of a part of his 
interest in the property is not affected fact that he and 
his predecessors had notice of the 
for which the assessment was levied that resulted in the 
lien for the establishment of the street and made no objection. 
854 C.2d 
APPEAL from a Los 
and reversed in part. 
Action to title to land and for Part of 
judgment declaring that plaintiff was owner of land subject 
to defendant's easement for street purposes, afiirmed; 
part of judgment determining that was to take noth-
ing by the action, reversed. 
Guerin & Guerin and ,John J. Guerin for Appellant. 
Roger Arnebergh, City AttornPy, Bourke Jones, Assistant 
City Attorney, Peyton H. JVIoorP, .Jr., Chief Deputy City Attor-
ney, and Spencrr h Halverson, Deputy City Attorney, for 
Respondent. 
CARTEl~, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment declaring 
that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land subject to 
the defendant city's easement for street purposes. He brought 
the action to quiet title to the land and for ejectment. He 
claims title by virtue of a city treasurer's deed issued to 
his predecessor in interest pursuant to a foreelosure sale 
following the default in payment of a street improvement 
bond issued under the Improvement Act of 1911 (now Sts. 
& Hy. Code, §§ 5000-6794). 
The assessment resulting in this bond was recorded on 
November 23, 1927. The bond was issued on December 28, 
1927, to the Municipal Bond Company. On November 25, 
1927, the defendant city commenced a condemnation proceed-
ing under the Street Opening Act of 1903 ( Sts. & Hy. Code, 
§§ 4000-4443), in which it acquired an easement for street pur-
poses across a part of the land upon which the improvement 
bond constituted a lien. Neither the owner of that lien nor any 
holder of the bond was joined as a party to the condemnation 
proceeding. Final judgment of condemnation was entered 
on July 23, 1931, and the record owner of the portion con-
demned was awarded and paid the sum of $5,376.20. The 
city took possession of the condemned property on January 
22, 1932, forthwith devoted it to public use as a part of a 
city street, and has continued to devote it to the same use. 
Meanwhile, on October 19, 1938, a certificate of treasurer's 
sale of the property in question was issued to one Al Schuh. 
The certificate was transferred to Betty ·wilson, and on 
855 
852; 306 P.2d 7891 
issued to her. She 
c~HULLLvu to 1951, and he filed 
this action on the following day. No portion of the assess-
ment or bond has been paid. 
The plaintiff contends that his title to the property is 
not subject to any city easement, bnt that even if the city 
has acquired an easement over the property, the doctrine of 
inverse condemnation entitles him to compensation for at least 
the value of the lien at the time the easement was acquired. 
The city claims that the 1927 condemnation proceeding 
established an easement over the property valid as against 
the plaintiff. It argues that the lien of the improvement 
bond was transferred to the award in the condemnation pro-
ceeding despite the failure to join the lienholder, and that 
the lienholder's remedy was to appear and assert his rights 
in the condemnation proceeding or to collect the amount of 
the bond from the person who received the award-the then 
owner of the fee. 
[1] Where a condemnation award is placed on deposit in 
court the lien attaches to the award and is removed from 
the condemned land. However, where, as here, the award 
has been paid to the owner of the fee, the rights of a lienholder 
who has not been joined as a party to the condemnation 
proceeding have not been clearly defined in this state. 
Generally, the statutes regulating eminent domain procedure 
make it evident that the lienholder's interest should be pro-
tected in some manner. (Thibodo v. United States [9th Cir.], 
187 F.2d 249, 255-257; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1244, subd. 2, 
§ 1245.3, § 1248, subds. 1, 8, § 1252.) The city did not choose 
to protect the lienholder by depositing the award into court 
as authorized by section 1252 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
It did not deduct the amount of the lien from the award, 
as authorized by subdivision 8 of section 1248 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. The interest of the lienholder in the prop-
erty was a matter of record. [2] Although the city was 
apparently required to make him a party to the condemna-
tion proceeding (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1244, subd. 2; see, 
also, Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.3), it did not do so, but under the 
1903 act only notice must be given (Sto;;. & Hy. Code, §§ 4209-
4211). From a consideration of all of the factors involved, it 
appears that the failure to join the lienholder in the 1927 con-
demnation proceeding left his lien unimpaired. (In accord, see 





use-it vests the eity with 
Co. v. of Los Angeles, 
; 1-Iossom v. C·ity Long Beach, 
P.2d 787]; v. City of Los 
99 [128 P.2d 693].) 
The \; eontention that the doctrine of inverse 
c:ondenmatiou entitle,; him to compensation for the taking 
of a of his interest in the property is correct. (Hillside 
Water Co. Los Angeles, supra; 17 Cal.Jur.2d, 
Eminent § 7, pp. 585-586; 18 Cal.J nr.2d, Eminent 
Domain, § pp. 95-96.) However, defendant contends that 
pw.u""""-'" daim for compensation is lost by his failure to 
file a claim with the city as required by sections 363 and 
876 of the charter 'l'hose sections require that a written 
daim for any money or damages asserted to be due from 
the be filed with the city clerk within six months after 
the occuiTence from which the claim arose. No claim of any 
kind unless plaintiff's complaint be so considered was ever 
filed by plaintiff. It is unnecessary to decide whether the plain-
tiff's claim arose in 1932 when the property was devoted 
to a use, in 1950 upon the issuance of the treasurer's 
or at some time between these two dates. The trial 
court found that no claim was filed by the plaintiff or his 
ed•ecE~ss,ors in interest, and this action was commenced more 
than six months after the treasurer's deed was issued, but 
as will be seen, it was not necessary for plaintiff to file a 
claim under the charter; the charter provisions have no appli-
eation to claims for compensation under inverse condemnation. 
Plaintiff was not required to file a claim with the city 
in order to be entitled to compensation for his land taken 
under the power of eminent domain. The claim filing re-
of the Los Angeles Charter (L. A. Charter, §§ 363, 
376) cannot to a claim for compensation when a taking 
is by eminent domain because it is not a municipal affair; 
it is a matter of statewide concern and may be regulated 
onJ;.r by the state Legislature•, such as the statutes of limita-
Feb.1957] 
tion. Even if 
provisions are not 
WILSON v. BEVILLE 
property taken eminent domain. 
It has been held that where 
posed by statute* the method or 
ment of the 
actions is not a 
(Wilkes 
393 [112 P.2d 
App.2d 242 
29 CaL2d 661 
of time, for filing claims 




is likewise exclusively of municipal concern and governed 
by its charter. Even if we assume respondent's her 
asserted conclusion does not follow. The and main-
tenance of public streets is typically a municipal affair ... 
but liability for defective streets, inclnding the procedure 
for enforcing it, is a matter state concern (Wilkes 
v. City, etc., of San Francisco (1941), supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 
393, 397 [112 P.2d 759] ; Donglass v. City of Los Angeles 
(1935), supra, 5 CaL2d 123, 128 P.2d 353]) .... [I]f 
the building be a proprietary undertaking the is liable 
for its torts regardless of the of Act 5619, supra 
(Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, p. 2630; Stats. 1923, p. 675) 
and if it be governmental in character liability is imposed 
by that act. In either ease the liability for includ·ing 
p1·oceduTe j'm· its ·is a matter concern.'' 
(Emphasis added.) In the Wilkes case the eonrt said (p. 395): 
"The right to reeoYery does not arise nnd0r charter provi-
sions but under ::;tate law. The state has thr power to pre-
scribe the method of enforcing the claim. If the state fixes 
the period as ninety within which snch a rlaim may 
be filed, a municipality, even by e}mrter may not 
ordain that the elaim will not be nn less filed 
within a shorter 
to senk damag('S 
risco as the rcsnlt of 
*Here it is imposed by the Constitution (Cnl. 
charter 
858 WILSON v. BEVILLE [47 0.2d 
of a public Such right exists only under the state 
law. The may not curtail or abridge such right 
by providing that the claim shall be filed within eighty-nine 
days or one day. If it had the right to fix a period of sixty 
days it like\vise has the power to change that period. The 
right to fix the time within which the claim may be filed is 
purely a legislative matter. (Dmtglass v. City of Los Angeles, 
5 Cal.2d 123 P.2d 353] ; Wicklttnd v. Plymouth E. School 
Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [99 P.2d 314]; Norton v. City of 
Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [53 P.2d 952]; Johnson v. City of 
Glendale, supm [ 12 Cal. A pp.2d 389 (55 P .2d 580)] ; Thomp-
son v. County Los 140 Cal.App. 73 [35 P.2d 185] ; 
Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [82 P.2d 
29] ; Strath v. City Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [65 
P.2d 894]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d 
267 [49 P.2d 320]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App. 
2d 732 [104 P.2d 102] ; Kline v. San Francisco U. School 
Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [104 P.2d 661]; Kelso v. Boar·d 
of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415 [109 P.2d 29] .) If the 
soundness of the rule that the claim must be filed in accord-
ance with the time limit provided in the statute rather than 
in the charter has been recognized by the courts of this 
state, as appears above, there can be no doubt that the same 
rule holds relative to the place of filing unless some good 
reason appears to the contrary." In the Eastlick ease the 
court said: "[A] city, by adopting a charter, becomes in-
dependent of general lavi·s only as to 'municipal affairs,' and 
that in matters of general statewide concern the general law 
is paramount ... that the existence of a municipality's 
liability for the dangerous or defective condition of its streets 
is a matter of state concern ... that with regard to snch 
a matter local regulations may be enforced only if they are 
not in conflict with the general law .... However, defendant 
contends that its charter provision as to itemization of dam-
ages is merely supplementary to the general law-an addi-
tional, not a contrary requirement-and therefore is valid. 
As authority for this position, defendant cites such cases 
as [citations]. But these cases concerned local prohibitory 
enactments adopted, in the municipality's exercise of the 
police power, in a field where the applieable state law con-
tained language expressly indieating that the Legislature did 
not intend its regulations to be exelusive .... '"Whether the 
legislature ll as undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field 
of legislation,' so that a local regulation imposing a higher 
Feb.1957] WILSON v. BEiriLLE 859 
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every case upon an of the statute 
and eircumstances upon whic-h it was intended to operate.' '' 
(Emphasis added; Eastlick v. Los Angeles, supra, 
29 Cal.2d 665-666.) [6] This is in line with the general 
rule that charter provisions eannot control in matters of 
statewide concern where the state has the field. 
'' Althoug·h the adoption of loeal rules supplementary to state 
law is proper under some circumstances, it is well settled 
that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose addi-
tional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by 
statute. ( ... Eastlick v. City of Los Lingeles, 29 Cal.2d 
661, 666 [177 P.2d 558, 170 A.I.1.R. 225].) Determination 
of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken to 
occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends upon 
an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts 
and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate. 
(Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, snpra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666; 
Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 372-375 [125 P.2d 
482, 147 A.L.R. 515] ; In 1·e Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 586-587 
[250 P. 681] ; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 642, 643 [192 
P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].) Where the Legislature has adopted 
statutes governing a partieular subject matter, its intent with 
regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local 
regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used 
but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. 
(Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666 . 
. . . ) " (Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 
280].) And: "If, however, there is any conflict between 
charter provisions and the compensation sections of the Labor 
Code, the latter must prevail. Under power expressly granted 
to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has established a 
complete system of workmen's compensation which obviously 
is a subject of state-wide concern, and it is well settled that 
in such matters the general law is paramount. (See Eastlick 
v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661, 665-666, 668 [177 
P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225] .) " (Healy v.Incl~tstrial Ace. Com., 
41 Cal.2d 118, 122 [258 P.2d 1] .) [7] The exercise of the 
power of eminent domain is a matter of statewide concern, 
not a municipal affair, which cannot be abrogated by a 
municipality; it must be exercised in accordance with state 
law. (Alexander v. Mitchell, 119 Cal.App.2d 816 [260 P.2d 
261] ; City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52 
[47 C.2d 
Cal.2d 630 
the field eminent 
''Private property shall 
use without just com-
or paid into court for, 
. shall be appropriated 
a municipal corporation 
therefor be made in money 
conrt the owner ... pro-
in eminent domain brought 
. . . the aforesaid . . . mu-
immediate possession and use of 
any of way . . . for a public use whether the 
fee thereof or an easement therefor be sought upon first com-
eminent domain according to law in a 
court of competent and thereupon giving such 
security in the way of money deposited as the court in which 
such are may direct, and in such amounts 
as the court may determine to be reasonably adequate to 
secure to the owner of the property sought to be taken imme-
diate payment of compensation for such taking and 
any damage incident thereto, including damages sustained 
by reason of an adjudication that there is no necessity for 
taking the as soon as the same can be ascertained 
according to law." added; Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 14.) [8] This is self-executing. (Rose v. State, 
19 Cal.2d 713 . ) The Legislature has provided 
a complete and detailed system for exercising the right of 
eminent domain and assessing compensation. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1237-1266.2.) 
Here the charter elaims provisions are stringent statutes 
of limitations-procedural restrictions. (Farrell v. County 
of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323]; 
Norton v. of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [53 P.2d 952]; Shea 
v. City of San BernarcUno, 7 Cal.2d 688 [62 P.2d 365] ; 
Thompson v. County Los 140 Cal.App. 73 [35 
P.2d 185]; Rhoda v. County of Alameda, 134 Cal.App. 726 
[26 P.2d 691] ; Rose v. State supm, 19 Cal.2d 713, 725, 
referring to Crescent Wharf etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 
430 [278 P. 1028] .) Such procedural matters are fully covered 
by the state statutes such as those on eminent domain (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1237 et seq.) and those on limiting the time 
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P.2d [13] In inverse condemnation the property owner 
is forced to proceedings otherwise he is remediless 
(Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [185 P.2d 
597] .) His action may be to recover the property and for 
preventive relief in that connection. (Collier v. Merced I rr. 
Dist., 213 Cal. 554 P.2d 790].) It is thus not a demand 
for money within the charter It becomes so only 
because the invokes the intervention of its public use 
as a defense to preventive relief and makes the property 
owner take compensation instead of his property. By wrong-
fully failing to follow the eminent domain procedure the 
city forces the property owner to take the initiative. It is 
still an eminent domain proceeding and claims are not neces-
sary in such proceedings. 
·while the instant eminent domain proceedings were under 
the 1903 Street Opening Act, supra, even if it is assumed that 
those provisions in some respects control over the general 
provisions on eminent domain in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
the fact still remains that there is a complete system of state 
law for eminent domain proceedings. 
[14] Defendant urges that plaintiff and his predecessors 
had notice of the improvement proceedings, for which an 
assessment was levied which resulted in the lien, for the es-
tablishment of the street and made no objection and is hence 
estopped and guilty of laches. \V e fail to see how the notice 
of the assessment proceedings affects the situation. Plaintiff 
relies upon the lien arising therefrom. There is no change of 
position in reliance on the inactivity of plaintiff's predeces-
sors except the establishment and use of the street. This use 
excludes the remedy to obtain possession of the land but not 
for compensation for the taking (see authorities cited in 
the forepart of this opinion). 
The judgment insofar as it determines that plaintiff is the 
owner of the property subject to the right of way for the 
street is affirmed but is reversed insofar as it determines that 
plaintiff is to take nothing by the action. Plaintiff shall re-
cover costs. 
Gibson, C. ,J., 'rraynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., and Dooling, J. pro 
tem., * concurred. 
SHENK, ,J.---I dissent. 
In 1927 the city of JJOS Angeles, pursuant to street 1m-
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
WILSON V. BEVILLE 
147 C.2d 852.; :106 P.2d 7891 
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under tlw Aet of 1911 
1911, p. 730; Sts. §§ 5000-6794) 
levied an assessment for benefits for street improvements on 
real property including Lot 195 'l'ract 6710. Assessments that 
were not paid went to bond, including the assessment on 
Lot 195 for $207.57, here involved. On December 28, 1927, 
the bond was acquired by the Municipal Bond Company. 
On November 25, 1927, the city commenced another street 
improvement proceeding pursuant to the Street Opening Act 
of 1903 ( Stats. 1903, p. 386). This proceeding was authorized 
by Ordinance 58294 entitled ''An ordinance ordering the lay-
ing out, opening and extending . . . '' of the streets named 
in the ordinance. By an order of condemnation pursuant to 
that proceeding the city acquired an easement for street pur-
poses across a part of Lot 195 upon which the improvement 
bond constituted a lien. The owner of the bond lien was 
not made a party to that condemnation proceeding. The 
assessment represented by the bond was not paid and the 
bond was foreclosed. On October 19, 1938, a certificate of 
treasurer's sale was issued to the plaintiff's predecessor in 
interest who quitclaimed to the plaintiff on April 12, 1951. 
This action to quiet title was commenced the following day. 
That the opening, widening and improvement of public 
streets within a chartered city is a municipal affair is the 
established law of this state, and there are no decisions to 
the contrary. Prior to 1896 municipal eharters were subject 
to and controlled by general laws. By an amendment of sec-
tion 6 of article XI of the Constitution in 1896 sneh eharters 
continued to be subjeet to and controlled by general laws 
"except in municipal affairs." In the ease of Byrne v. Drain 
( 1900), 127 CaL 663, this eourt said at page 667 [ 60 P. 433] : 
"That the matter of opening the streets of a municipality 
is a municipal affair is not disputable under the authorities. 
(Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. [525] 531; People v. Holladay, 
93 Cal. 241 [29 P. 54, 27 Am.St.Rep. 186]; Hellman v. 
Shoulters, 114 CaL [136] 141 [44 P. 915, 45 P. 1057] .) " 
In the ease of City of Los Angeles v. Central Trust Co. of 
New York, 173 CaL 323, this court stated at page 327 [159 
P. 1169]: "The opening, laying out, and improvement of 
streets within a city, and the regulation of the manner of 
their use are matters of much greater concern to its inhabitants 
than to the people of the state at large, and they are clearly 
municipal affairs, the control of which has always been deemed 




was sueh a street improvement 
a muni(;ipal affair. The sub-
under the Street Opening Aet of 1903 
for the improvement of a city street 
and likewise a municipal affair. If the 
holder of the bond lien had been made a party to the latter 
the amount now sought to be recovered by the 
·would have been in due course by assessment 
on lands benefited the improvement or by funds otherwise 
under the control of the city. 
The matter of claims against the city for money 
or is likewise a municipal affair and the city by 
charter sections 3G3 and 37G has prescribed a reasonable 
time within 1vhieh claims must be presented before suit may 
be brought thereon. In the case of BancToft v. City of San 
Diego, 120 Cal. 432 [52 P. 712], the plaintiff owned property 
in the on street which was damaged by reason 
of the of the street grade. This court held that 
was in a sense a taking of the property as con-
the Constitution. 'l'he plaintiff failed to present 
a claim to the city within the six months pre-
scribed the charter. 'fhe court held that the action 
should be dismissed for failure to present the claim within 
the time. In Crescent Wharf &: TV arehouse Co. v. 
207 Cal. 430 [278 P. 1028], the Bancroft 
case was cited wtih Among other cases also cited 
to support the holding of the Crescent ·wharf case is TV esteTn 
Salt Co. v. San Diego, 181 Cal. 696 [186 P. 345], 
where it was held that there is no grneral law on the subject 
of the time when such a claim must be presented to the city 
and that a charter so providing is constitutional. Those 
eases have never been overruled or criticized and there has 
been and is no anthority in this state to the contrary until 
the holding of the majority in the present case. 
Furthermore, the charter provision is controlling irrespec-
tive of whether it concerns a municipal affair if it is not 
865 
but there is no state 
as the majority holds, 
occupied the field to the exclusion of inverse condemnation 
claim filing requirements in municipal charters. In fact, there 
is no state legislation vvhatsoever on the subject, and hereafter 
there will be no charter provisions on the subject. 
The majority rely on cases in which statutes specify the 
time for filing claims, such as cases arising under the Public 
Liability Act of 1923, to which Government Code, section 
53052, applies. As noted, there is no statute applicable to 
claims arising under the circumstances here presented. In 
Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661 [177 P.2d 558, 
170 A.L.R. 225], a case where the Public Liability Act applied, 
the court stated that a municipality may adopt a charter 
provision regulating the presentation of claims and the terms 
thereof are applicable to a cause of action against the city 
where ''there is no general law upon the subject.'' There 
is no general law on the subject of the time of filing of inverse 
condemnation claims and the provisions of sections 363 and 
376 of the charter of the city of Los Angeles are fully appli-
cable to the claim here involved. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 7, 
1957. Dooling, J. pro tem., participated therein in place of 
McComb, J. Shenk, J., and Spence, .J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
47 C.2d-28 
